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Scientism after its Discontents
Andrés Pereyra Rabanal1
RESUME — Le scientisme a plus de notoriété que l’histoire proprement dite, car il a
été identifié avec le « positivisme », le « réductionnisme », le « matérialisme » ou
le « marxisme », ou même tenu pour responsable de l’application de la science au
détriment d’autres affaires humaines. L’idée que la recherche scientifique produit
les meilleures connaissances possibles réside dans la définition même du « scien-
tisme ». Cependant, même lorsque la science a montré un nombre considérable
de succès théoriques et pratiques, une confiance rationnelle mise sur elle comme
moyen de résoudre tout problème factuel a été dénoncée comme illégitime, dé-
fectueuse ou dogmatique. Ainsi, après avoir revisité les variétés de la signification
du scientisme, je plaide pour une défense raisonnable du scientisme contre cer-
taines de ses critiques dominantes. Par conséquent, on soutiendra que la science
est l’approche la plus fiable pour acquérir des connaissances sans nuire à d’autres
activités humaines précieuses dans la mesure où celles-ci ne traitent pas de ques-
tions factuelles ou cognitives ni ne sont en contradiction avec une vision du monde
scientifique.
ABSTRACT — Scientism has more notoriety than history proper for it has been iden-
tified with “positivism”, “reductionism”, “materialism” or “Marxism”, or even held
responsible for the enforcement of science at the expense of other human affairs.
The idea that scientific research yields the best possible knowledge lies at the very
definition of “scientism”. However, even when science has shown a considerable
amount of theoretical and practical successes, a rational confidence put on it as a
mean for solving any factual problem has been denounced as illegitimate, defec-
tive, or dogmatic. Thereby, after revisiting the varieties of the meaning of scien-
tism, I argue for a reasonable defense of scientism against some of its prevailing
criticisms. Hence, it will be sustained that science is the most reliable approach for
attaining knowledge without detriment of other valuable human activities insofar
these do not address factual or cognitive questions nor are at odds with a scientific
worldview.
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Science has shown a considerable amount of successes since the early modern
period. Progress was not limited to astronomy nor mechanics but reached the
discovery of oxygen, the development of cell theory, the principles of natural se-
lection, and research on the neural basis of learning. Social research has neither
dispense with the use of the scientific method as seen in cognitive linguistics,
economics, and mathematical sociology. Proposals such as string theory or evo-
lutionary psychology have received criticism but have not eclipsed the advance-
ment of contemporary science on matters of all kinds. Testimony of emerging
disciplines from computer sciences to behavioral neurosciences is an evidence
of the pivotal role of science in our age.
The departure from mythological explanations can be traced back to the
studies on geometry, medicine, and natural philosophy made in ancient Babylo-
nia, Egypt, and Greece. Even technological innovations in Chinese, Indian and
Roman cultures are evidence of the growing adoption of a rational approach for
understanding reality. Except for the romantic revolt led by Hegelian philoso-
phy, no development in culture, health, or industry have been done in foreign
ways of science and technology. Certainly, neither warfare nor global warming
would have been possible without scientists, but this is not the fault of science
itself but rather of partisan politics to the extent that German eugenics and Ly-
senkoism share the same ideological bankruptcy.
If we cannot deny the historical achievements of science, shouldn’t we adopt
a scientific worldview instead of relying on religious authority or cultural tradi-
tion? Such worldview exists and is commonly—and derogatory—called “scien-
tism”. Moreover, it is denounced as illegitimate or even vicious. One can revise
the historical evolution of the term in Schöttler (2017). Suffice is here to say that
scientism has been identified with “positivism”, “reductionism”, “materialism”
or “Marxism”, and even held responsible for the enforcement of science to the
detriment of other human practices, the condoning of industrialism in third-
world countries, and even for the spread of atheism. Such diversity of meanings
suggests that scientism has more notoriety than history proper which will not
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be addressed here. I am going to argue instead for a reasonable defense of sci-
entism against some of its prevailing criticisms.
1 AGAINST SCIENTISM
Scientism was endorsed as early by adherents of French Enlightenment, laymen
and arguably most contemporary scientists and scientific philosophers (Bunge,
2016). The term was coined by the time of Renan, Renouvier or Bernard Shaw
albeit as an “arbitrary use” of science (Schöttler, 2017). Fauverty criticized the
“orthodoxy” of science while attempting to reconcile reason and religion. Similar
objections were shared by spiritualists, occultists, and firm believers (Raynaud,
2017). Conversely, scientism was openly defended by La Mettrie, Condorcet,
D’Holbach, Le Dantec, and Lalande. According to Haack (2012), these authors
may have overestimated science and even denigrated other valuable human ac-
tivities. Against this trend, Dilthey, Bergson, Hayek, the Frankfurt School, post-
modernists, radical skeptics or constructivists reacted against whatever they
identify as “scientism” in Comte’s positivism, the Vienna Circle, or Western in-
dustrialism. Moreover, any vigorous defense of science will be quickly labelled
as “dogmatic”, “lame”, “narrow”, “pedantic”, “pretentious”, or worse, “false”
(Schöttler, 2017, p. 40). Thus, it is the influence of scientism that may have been
overestimated or consciously exaggerated by its critics as it was neither a dom-
inant phenomenon nor a well-received stance in society.
The view that “scientism” meant a mode of thought that considers things
from a scientific viewpoint was soon superseded by its current negative conno-
tations spread by Hayek (1942) in the human and social sciences. The following
definitions are representative of the “anti-scientism” sentiment in academia and
comprehensive perspectives of the debate can be found in De Ridder et al.
(2018), Boudry and Pigliuci (2017) and Andrade (2017).
For instance, Haack (2012) conceives scientism as “a kind of over-enthusias-
tic and uncritically deferential attitude towards science, an inability to see or an
unwillingness to acknowledge its fallibility, its limitations, and its potential dan-
gers” (p. 76). Famed authors as Hawking, Krauss, Harris, or Rosenberg are to be
found guilty of this trend for their contempt of philosophy and the humanities
which is noticeably on the rise as much more pervasive as thought. Pigliuci
(2017) defines it as an “activity that projects itself into domains or areas of in-
quiry where it does not (allegedly) properly belong” (p. 187). Scientism is also
seen responsible for making extraordinary claims on behalf of science but deliv-
ering little to nothing to support them (Pigliuci, 2015). Unwarranted assertions
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are, however, usually unreasonable. If those assertions met any rational or ac-
ceptable standard, can we carry on with scientism after all, or will it still be con-
demned because of certain “boundaries” science is said to cross in order to en-
compass other academic disciplines or even realms of reality?
But what are those fields science should not dare to venture? Remarkably
Haack (2017) is thinking in other valuable forms of inquiry such as the historical,
legal, and literary as well as human activities such as music, art, storytelling, jok-
ing or cooking. But excluding historical research, none of them seems to have
descriptive, explanatory, or predictive aims as they do not constitute scientific
enterprises of their own. Of course, the legal system can (and should) be aided
by scientific techniques such as blood sampling, facial recognition techniques
and reliable psychological measurements but Law Schools do not produce labor-
atory or field lawyers. On the other hand, no one studies culinary arts for a better
understanding of the cultural or economic impact of food (less for learning its
nutritional values) but for improving their cooking skills. The problem appears
to be Hayek’s (1942) blending of “physicalism” with “scientism” as the social sci-
ences don’t need to cling upon radiocarbon dating or geological remote sensing
but to their own techniques such as cohort studies, scatter plots or field surveys
adopting the “methods and language of science” (although certainly not those of
the “natural” sciences). Other human activities are not at odds with science in-
sofar as they do not have factual content but follow instead practical, social, aes-
thetic, or recreational ends with the clear exception of religion and ideology.
Gould’s (1997) famous complaint against overlapping magisteria between
science and religion seems to be a direct confrontation with scientism. This can
also be mirrored in Snow’s depiction of the incomprehension between the natu-
ral sciences and the humanities. True is that neither art, music, or literature
make factual claims so extending the domain of science to them would be rather
unilluminating and misleading (Mahner and Bunge, 1996b). But religions and
ideologies do pretend to tell us something about reality, so they are actually
crossing these boundaries with claims at times incompatible with those made by
science about the world. Surely one can discuss whether descriptive or explana-
tory assertions can overshadow normative claims but what matters is that sci-
entists are often intimidated to research assertions of nonscientific disciplines
even if they are blatantly false (e.g. psychoanalytic accounts of repressed mem-
ories), or at least questionable (e.g. biological basis of gender roles) for fear of
being labelled as “pretentious” or “defective”.
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It is also important to notice how science already assists long-lived philo-
sophical issues such as moral cognition (e.g. whether our ethical intuitions are
universal or not), philosophy of mind (e.g. fMRI record of parietal activation), or
even ontology (e.g. an understanding of emergent properties). As Buckwalter
and Turri (2018) state, contravening boundaries is not always amiss. Moreover,
the distinction between human sciences (Geisteswissenchaften) and natural sci-
ences (Naturwissenschaften) was stillborn when Dilthey came up with the idea
that social studies deserve an intuitive or “empathic” method of interpretation
(Bunge, 2016). Neuropsychology, biological anthropology, and population geog-
raphy are living examples that the dichotomy between nature and culture is spu-
rious and in clear contrast with the dubious inferences of “interpretative sociol-
ogy” and “cultural studies”.
Regrettably “anti-scientism”, namely, the rejection of scientism mainly for its
negative connotations, is well spread in intellectual circles and it would not be
surprising that even scientists themselves dismiss it. Hereby, Haack (2012)
makes a sober characterization of scientism in terms of certain “signs” to avoid.
First, the use of terms like “science”, “scientific” or “scientifically” is de-
nounced as a gratuitous endorsement of epistemic praise. As noticed earlier, any
claim raised with unwarranted assertions is not scientistic per se but an example
of defective arguing. Moreover, the examples given by Pigliuci (2017) seems to
be a case of media sensationalism such as popular advertisements or science
divulgation gone mad. But blind enthusiasm and dubious marketing is to be con-
sidered a psychological or sociological sign rather than an internal feat of scien-
tism. A second sign is the improper usage of scientific language or mathematical
terms to make apparent sense of nonsense. While a valid point, it is neither an
essential feat of scientism as even authors of the so-called Sokal’s affair were
accused of using incorrect or meaningless concepts (e.g. “lacanian” topography
or Irigaray’s ludicrous account of fluid mechanics), but not of committing to sci-
entism. Here again clarity is a form of courtesy that both the philosopher and
men of science owe.
Haack’s third sign is rather suspicious as she marks out the preoccupation
with demarcation as a distinctive sign of scientism but shortly afterwards admits
that there is indeed a distinction (although not a sharp one) between sciences
and other activities. Scientific research is described as “more systematic, refined
and persistent” (2012, p. 26) with the familiar procedure of conjecture-and-
checking along the specialized techniques devised in various fields (Haack,
2017). It happens that later she characterizes “bad science” as done carelessly,
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mainly too vague, with decorative symbolism and purely speculative statements.
It is then a sample of kindness not to call this a “pseudoscience” or a “faulty sci-
ence” as these feats are commonly found within claims falsely pretending to be
a scientific (see also Romero, 2018). On the contrary, Pigliuci (2017) replies that
“scientistic” research is not one of demarcation but of “expansionism” as every-
thing worth inquiring must be amenable to scientific analysis (p. 192). What is
relevant to be researched is flour from another sack, but certainly scientism fol-
lows Russell’s (1946) conviction that whatever can be known, can be known by
the means of science.
A special concern for scientific method is another alleged sign of scientism.
There is an extended idea that adherents of scientism advocate for the existence
of a single method to rule them all. In fact, scientism endorses the superiority of
scientific method in matters of all (cognitive) kinds, but not the neglecting of
other forms of inquiry. Haack would agree with the idea that there may be a gen-
eral method (“an underlying pattern of all serious scientific research”) coexist-
ing with more specific methods developed for each field. With the aid of a sys-
tematic method we can tackle factual issues, but it would be indeed an exercise
in bad praxis to look to science for answers to questions beyond their scope. In
any case, technology, ethics, and wise decisions help solve social or political
problems, not science alone.
Last but not least, Haack’s (2012) final objection against scientism is its de-
valuation of the diverse. Government efforts to focus resources on science edu-
cation at the expense of other fields is a denigration of scientism of other valua-
ble activities (Haack, 2017). Of course, investment in Latin American science
remains considerably inferior to blocks such as the European Union or the
United States, so third-world countries would be free of scientism according to
this. Certainly, asking for the importance of science over cultural expressions is
a misguided question. Worrisome is the paternal attitude adopted about the dis-
placement of “old traditions” by scientific practices blaming them for the “im-
personal” character of, for example, modern medicine (Haack, 2012, p. 36). Be-
yond a personal right to long for these beloved traditions, this is not a sign of
intellectual opening but of cultural conservatism.
One cannot deny that there is a complementary risk of the underestimation
of science, namely, its overestimation. But the problem does not lie on an enthu-
siastic confidence for its achievements over religious or traditional knowledge
are undeniable. Neither is that scientific discourse is recalcitrant to internal or
external criticisms for philosophy and sociology of science are responsible for
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giving accounts of these. It is providing a caricature of science that can hamper
scientific progress that does not do justice to the efforts, setbacks, and bias pre-
sent in science. Enemies of scientism react by mocking the whole enterprise as
an outcome of “Western rationality”, by greeting “alternative” or pseudoscien-
tific practices, or by limiting even more public funding of science. In line with
Haack’s reasoning, this is not so much a problem of scientism but an example of
media portrayal of scientism. (For a criticism of science in media culture, see
Elias, 2018).
It may be further objected that to question the limits of scientific knowledge
belongs to philosophy turning scientism self-refuting as it cannot be empirically
proven. Naturally, one could circumscribe philosophy to conceptual or logical
analysis (Ayer, 1936). This is, however, not needed as scientism can be deemed
as an epistemological or methodological postulate presupposed by the bulk of
scientific knowledge. Philosophical theses too can become scientific if they test
their theories by their interaction with more specific theories of science while
using as many exact tools as possible (Romero, 2018). Haack (2017) admits that
proceeding in philosophy should be as rigorous as the best scientific inquiry if it
also takes into consideration everyday experience. If the role of philosophy is to
frame the semantical, ontological, epistemological, and methodological aspects
of various issues, the question then is if there is a tenable or equally compatible
type of inquiry other than science.
2 THE VARIETIES OF SCIENTISM
Nor only should we accept that there are multiple usages of the term “scientism”
but also that it would be untenable if it does not rely on a suitable philosophy.
As there are many recent trends in philosophical inquiry such as constructive
empiricism, naturalized epistemology, or theoretical structuralism, not all of
them understand “scientism” in the same way. The kind of philosophy here en-
dorsed aligns with “scientific realism”. (For a comprehensive review see Sankey,
2008; Bunge, 2006; Niiniluoto, 1999). Accordingly, we need first to refine the
varieties of scientism.
Peels (2018) distinguishes between academic and universal scientism. The
former is divided into methodological scientism (i.e. disciplines should adopt the
methods of the natural sciences) and eliminative scientism (i.e. disciplines other
than the natural sciences have nothing to add to our bulk of knowledge). But the
author misguidedly identifies observation and experimentation as the methods
of natural sciences as if they were not already used in the social sciences. On the
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other hand, eliminative scientism is reductionism be towards physics (Neurath)
or biology (Wilson), but can also be towards sociology (Woolgar), politics (Fou-
cault) or economics (Marx). Thereupon, “methodological scientism” can be re-
defined just as the expansion of the methods of science to other academic disci-
plines.
“Universal scientism” is also a rather misguided term as it also encompasses
eliminative reductionism. Here science attempts to answer the once epistemo-
logical, ontological, or moral problems. Peels (2018) concludes that the concep-
tual core of scientism is the expansion of its boundaries. Some claims are indeed
unwarranted such as that all genuine knowledge is to be found only through nat-
ural science in detrimental to the human and social sciences. But factual science
comprises both kinds of sciences. And although optimistic, we can neither rule
out some limitations of scientific research while keeping a reasonable confi-
dence in its endeavor.
For their part, Buckwalter and Turri (2018) contrast “radical scientism” (i.e.
science as the only way to acquire knowledge about reality) with “moderate sci-
entism” (i.e. science is a good way of answering any factual question). The for-
mer is likewise false as there are other forms of inquiry and even other organ-
isms gain knowledge about their surroundings without being practicing
scientists while the latter coincides with the strategy of scientific expansionism
(Pigliuci, 2017; Stenmark, 2014). Nonetheless, according to this view, science
can be deemed as a useful tool for deepening our understanding of the world but
nowhere is stated to be the best one. Therefore, it represents science as only
helpful (but not the only one) for answering questions typically thought to fall
outside of it.
“Radical” or “strong” scientism can be tracked in Quine’s naturalized episte-
mology and Stitch and Churchland “revolutionary scientism” (Haack, 2009). But
it is hard to know whether they would accept the label of being radical. As Miz-
rahi (2017) notices, these characterizations are usually persuasive definitions
which express disapproval of scientism. Only Rosenberg (2018) is an exemplar
of the advocacy of “strong scientism”. He vocally states that there is no meaning
in the universe, that metaphysics and ethics are derived from science, and that
all we need is the scientific method, although he seems to encompass eliminative
and causal realism to a certain extent.
But on a more positive trend, certain philosophers have openly defended sci-
entism as Ladyman and Ross (2007). These authors attempt to take contempo-
rary science seriously enough for building a “naturalistic metaphysics” that
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enriches our “relatively unified picture of the world” (p. 27). In a rather critical
tone, they also reject what they label as “neo-scholastic metaphysics” found in
analytic philosophy and propose instead that our ontology should not rest upon
intuition or common sense but on science itself. They go beyond criticizing phi-
losophers who use “outdated or domesticated science” (p. 17) or make generic
rather than specific claims. It is further argued for the “primacy of physics” based
on its maturity and the asymmetry between physical science and other disci-
plines. Although reductionists, Ladyman and Ross end up mentioning that expla-
nations in other sciences should at least be consistent with what is known in the
physical and biological sciences. In their views, “scientism” is to be considered
as a stance which encompasses a certain version of empiricism and materialism
(p. 63).
The case of Bunge (1986) is similar although he adopts critical realism as a
distrust of sense data that encourages the building of sophisticated conceptual
systems which include some concepts that have only a remote relation with re-
ality but refer nonetheless to a certain domain of facts (p. 23). The acceptance of
emergent levels favors the merger or convergence of disciplines and frees us
from the charges of reductionists. Therefore is the idea that scientific research
yields the best possible knowledge of reality which lies in the very definition of
“scientism” (Bunge, 2016).
Sorrell (2013) attaches a valuative element on scientism as a matter of put-
ting too high a value on science in comparison with other aspects of society. This
is important as Mizrahi’s (2017) account of “weak scientism” (i.e. science is not
the only way to attain knowledge) would be indistinguishable from moderate
scientism without a value put on it (e.g. science or technology are the best among
others and even considered prized commodities). With everything revised, we
can sketch three versions of “scientism” according to what kinds of boundaries
it crosses and how much confidence is deposited in scientific enterprise:
1. Strong scientism—Science is necessary and enough for yielding
knowledge
2. Moderate scientism—Science is necessary but not enough for yield-
ing knowledge
3. Weak scientism—Science is enough but not necessary for yielding
knowledge
Only cognitive aims are to be supposed here, so this distinction is strictly episte-
mological ruling out ontological or moral implications. Strong scientism argues
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that scientific enterprise is necessary for yielding knowledge as it has proven to
be the only reliable source of knowledge against superstition or speculation. But
what stands more about it is not that science is enough but either theoretical
physics, evolutionary biology, or neurosciences at best. Hence most of the advo-
cates of strong scientism are also reductionists.
It is striking that Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue for a “weak metaphysics”
as long as it is not an activity that has a specialized science of its own (p. 65). This
“deflationary” project (whether defensible or not) is further criticized by Haack
(2017) as barely more than promoting a meta-science. But the mere idea of a
science-oriented philosophy is not necessarily dependent upon reductionism
(Rescher, 2003), nor need to abdicate from scientism (Romero, 2018; Bunge,
2012). The case against strong scientism consists of establishing whether other
forms of inquiry are nonexistent or illegitimate.
While “strong scientism” as represented by Rosenberg, Hawking and Stitch
may deny that other nonscientific disciplines produce legitimate knowledge,
Mizrahi’s (2017) “weak scientism” admits that scientific knowledge is the best
among others. But to have such a clear conviction of the superiority of science
does not seem to be a weak stance but rather a moderate one. Compare this to
Buckwalter’s and Turri’s (2018) “moderate scientism” which is actually weaker
as it asserts that scientific knowledge can be good enough but not the best one
as there can be other means to attain knowledge. Arguably Buckwalter, Turri,
Pigliuci, Haack and many practising scientists would endorse “weak scientism”
without the label while admitting that it is trivial and uninteresting to keep it.
Moderate scientism further states that science cannot rest upon pragmatic
justification only. As Raynaud (2017) points out, there is no practical utility in
Young’s experimental test of the ondulatory nature of light, or in discovering that
the Beck’s tree frog can be divided into two different species in spite of their
morphological similarities (p. 73). Science certainly works but should also be
theoretically sustained. In fact, most utilitarian attitudes applied to science can-
not be directed towards basic research while ignoring that science as a social
activity rests upon institutional norms (Ladyman and Ross, 2007) or research
communities (Romero, 2018).
Shermer (2002) defines scientism as “a scientific worldview that encom-
passes natural explanations for all phenomena, eschews supernatural and para-
normal speculations, and embraces empiricism and reason as the twin pillars of
a philosophy of life appropriate for an Age of Science” (p. 35). Scientific realism
follows this by including scientism as the epistemological and methodological
Andrés Pereyra Rabanal | Scientism after its Discontents 11
Mεtascience | No.2 | online January 16, 2021
branches of the matrix of scientific progress (Bunge, 2012). Therefore, science
is not only one form of inquiry among others but the most reliable one. And alt-
hough valuable in itself, it does not need to deter other human activities. Inno-
vations in vaccines, medicines, roads, and industrial processes are all due to ad-
vancements in basic research, but without music, art, literature, or
jurisprudence neither would we be far from having left Altamira’s cave. It seems
that the insistence of Haack (2017) in everyday experience is due to the so-called
“Big Questions” whatever these are (likely Kant’s questions). Surely intuition
and ordinary experience can lead to ordinary or literary reflections and some of
them are valuable. But having sophisticated science-oriented systems, commit-
ting to folk philosophy still be necessary?
3 IN DEFENSE OF SCIENTISM
The boundaries scientism is said to cross is any cognitive domain with a factual
reference to it. After all, no one has accused a mathematician or logician of sci-
entism no matter how much confidence he or she has to their formal or abstract
procedures. Now we can state the principles found tenable for scientism and
why we should endorse it:
1. Science is the most reliable approach for attaining knowledge of the
world
2. Scientific methods address intellectual problems, not things
3. There should not be a blockage of scientific inquiry
As repeated until weary, scientism is defined as the thesis that cognitive prob-
lems are best tackled by adopting the scientific approach as it can yield the truest
and deepest possible knowledge of things (Bunge, 2016; 1986). There are in-
deed other kinds of inquiries and knowledge, but science is a pattern of inquiry
which provides systematic knowledge and no alternative system be it religion,
mythology, ancestral wisdom, or pseudoscience has matched its success in solv-
ing conceptual issues. Moreover, it was science by (pleasantly) crossing bound-
aries that lead to the discovery of the recession of nearby galaxies thus suggest-
ing the idea of cosmic expansion, the common ancestry between man and beast,
or the mechanisms of aspirin from the native uses of Spiraea. Against divine cre-
ation, intelligent design, or herbal healing, science successfully gave a better ac-
count of the phenomena purportedly explained by them. Certainly, scientists like
Newton or Lemaître were religious, but science progresses not due to cultural
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and religious tradition which anyway can encourage or hamper research, but in
spite of them.
Haack (2017) admits that scientists have amplified the process of inquiry, so
they have figured things out better. Scientific enterprise allegedly uses the same
procedures and inferences as everyday inquiry, so scientists have improved, re-
fined, amplified, and augmented them but holding the conviction that it is noth-
ing more than refined common sense. Nonetheless, while herbal medicine can
yield useful results, botany gives us a deeper account of their therapeutic effects
by analyzing their mechanisms and efficacy, e.g. isolating the active compounds,
and conducting double-blind studies. By deepening the state of affairs, science is
a better account of ordinary knowledge. But it also gives us counterintuitive in-
formation such as rejecting the flatness of the Earth contrary to common sense.
So, science does not only provide a more refined representation of reality but
also corrects our intuitions.
Precisely Ladyman and Ross (2007) criticizes the dependence on intuition
and common sense that might lead to an outdated scientific image (p. 10) and
can be extended to ordinary language analysis and phenomenology (Buckwalter
and Turri, 2018). Although ordinary knowledge is to some extent indispensable,
scientific research starts by acknowledging that background knowledge is in-
deed insufficient or even conflicting with our current theories. Therefore, sci-
ence gives us counterintuitive pieces of knowledge (Bunge, 2016). But how can
we quantify how much better is scientific knowledge in comparison to other
forms of inquiry? The measurement of the impact of research papers and aca-
demic journals is a relevant index, but its qualitative evaluation has deep roots
in the philosophy of science regarding its explanatory, instrumental and predic-
tive success (Azrahi, 2017).
Literature and the arts are also said to help us grasp a deeper meaning of the
human condition. Actually, experimental psychology teaches us that art is influ-
enced by emotional state, ambiguity, perception, and expectations (Jakesch and
Leder, 2009; Jacobsen, 2006). Art is not scientific but its investigation as a cul-
tural artifact that produces aesthetic responses can be scientific (Romero, 2018).
Moreover, allegories and metaphors can be vicariously descriptive or reformu-
lated as saying something factually true or false (Mahner and Bunge, 1996b). For
example, the insight of the morals of a fable can be seen as the formulation of a
rule of behavior. And when conveniently interpreted by theologians, some bib-
lical myths are symbolic rather than literal. At best they can fulfill a pedagogical
or vicarious purpose as in Plato’s allegories. But in general, art does not need to
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rely on describing the nature of reality but on producing aesthetic experiences,
so there is no actual conflict between science and the arts.
Naturally, philosophy and the humanities are open to more mundane reflec-
tions through everyday experience, but this can be one point of departure inso-
far common sense cannot be taken for granted. Otherwise we run the risk of
transforming philosophy into naïve physics or folk psychology. And for most of
their branches, the humanities can benefit from adopting a more scientific ap-
proach by making grounded conjectures, weighing the reasons or evidence, ar-
riving to a conclusion and carefully examining it (Haack, 2012) while avoiding
ad hoc guessing and metaphorical talk.
As stated earlier, the scientific method is a general pattern of inquiry and
should not be restricted to any kind of science but as the kernel of scientism as
such (Bunge, 1986). Although philosophers throughout history have doubted
about the method (Popper) or even denied its very existence (Feyerabend), its
employment has proven to be superior to relying on intuition, authority, or rev-
elation (Peirce, 1955, p. 18). Moreover, it is not enough to hold true propositions
but to be able to give an account of how we come to know that a statement is
true. We also must consider that the scientific approach is applied to the full
gamut of cognitive or intellectual problems (Bunge, 1998). That means that in-
distinctly from its subject matter, be it protons, tectonic layers, ape behavior,
economic recessions, or political crisis all can be studied with the aid of the sci-
entific method. The “myriad specialized techniques” devised by scientists
(Haack, 2017) from the microscope to the psychometric questionnaire obey a
general strategy of research that begins with identifying a problem and using
our intellectual and empirical resources for reaching a tentative solution.
The last principle states that any factual question can be formulated in intel-
lectual terms. Although there may be de facto beyond scientific investigation,
there is nothing that could not be de jure studied scientifically (Bunge and Mah-
ner, 1996, p. 103). As everything is open in principle to scientific research, we
must avoid any attempt of blocking the way of inquiry (Peirce, 1955, p. 54). Its
imperative form can be reformulated as stating that any factual domain worth
being inquired should lack of border patrols. Noticeably Peirce suggested that
the first rule of reason is to try any theory so long as it is adopted “in such a sense
as to permit the investigation to go on unimpeded and undiscouraged” (p. 54).
And the first impediment to this is admitting the unknowable. What is unwar-
ranted is not our scientific attempts to understand better or our “epistemic
Andrés Pereyra Rabanal | Scientism after its Discontents 14
Mεtascience | No.2 | online January 16, 2021
optimism”, but to call out for dogma where no reason nor evidence but tradition
and revelation might play a better role.
There are no royal roads in science or philosophy so we should go on without
assuming intrinsic boundaries of scientific inquiry. While conjectures are at first
speculative and some are eventually abandoned, science can correct itself pro-
gressively. It is then not clear why this kind of scientism would be considered
“dogmatic”, “lame”, “narrow” or “pretentious”. As a methodological principle,
scientism relies upon an ontology that fathoms our scientific worldview. In
short, scientism is not only tenable, but also desirable for our intellectual herit-
age. But there is a major risk of “anti-scientism”, namely, that it denies not only
that science is our best strategy but as equal as any other knowledge. And when
everything is the same, then nothing, not a single intellectual endeavor or a sin-
cere fervor for knowing would really matter.
4 AN ADDENDUM ON PSEUDO-SCIENTISM
As any other human idea or device, scientism can also be falsified. Its core idea,
that is, that any cognitive problem is best tackled by adopting the scientific atti-
tude and method, can be accepted by both laymen and specialists alike. Yet there
are abuses of the term which both can share the label of “pseudo-scientism”.
A first meaning arises from the concept of which it is an -ism itself, i.e. “pseu-
doscience”. By arranging our previous definition, pseudo-scientism defends the
idea that pseudosciences are reliable or legitimate approaches for acknowledg-
ing or influencing the world. For instance, psychoanalytical lessons are usually
tolerated along behavioral and physiological approaches, or homeopathic “med-
icine” can be found in the curricula of scientific medicine. Hence “pseudo-scien-
tism” can be defined as the promotion of pseudosciences as if they were authen-
tic sciences because they exhibit some of their attributes (e.g. use of
mathematical symbols) (Bunge, 2017, p. 27). Nonetheless pseudosciences strug-
gle for passing the litmus test of internal consistence, compatibility with previ-
ous knowledge, or empirical testability, not to mention they are based on non-
scientific philosophies.
Canonical examples of “pseudo-scientism” can be found in orthodox psycho-
analysis, Lysenkoism, creationism and doctrinal Marxism. These do not deni-
grate science per se but support it under the condition that they are included
against “bourgeois”, “reductionistic”, “materialistic”, “positivistic”, “colonialistic”
or “Western” science while thickening their “protective belt” against refutations,
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empirical proofs or any other standard of scientific contrasting. There is not
much more to say about this meaning of pseudo-scientism. Insofar as pseudosci-
ences are identified and denounced, they should not be promoted either by uni-
versities or by the State as they can be hazardous in terms of health and educa-
tional policy. We must not forget the denunciation of “Jewish science” that
delayed Germany from relativistic physics. Their pervasiveness in culture and
why people believe weird things is rather a matter of psychological and socio-
logical research as Sharmer puts it.
Another widespread and more relevant meaning should be, however, dis-
cussed. From the “two cultures” chasm, a tendency arises to grant greater confi-
dence to the “hard sciences” to the detriment of the “soft sciences”. This sense of
pseudoscientism is detrimental as governmental funding is usually directed to
the former and does not help to extend the idea that science is necessary to un-
derstand phenomena not addressed by physics or chemistry alone. On the con-
trary, it gives the idea that either everything is to be reduced to physics or biol-
ogy, or there are aspects that cannot be explained due to their “complexity” thus
giving rise to pseudoscientific and religious narratives.
A vivid example are scientists carrying out research in the Specola Vaticana.
There is no doubt about the seriousness of their astrophysical queries, but it is
also common to oppose them to nonreligious laymen who stress the incompati-
bility between religious and scientific education but happen not to have a PhD in
physical sciences. Most of the Catholic priests are physicists, cultivated philoso-
phers, and theologians, but what counts are the argumentative soundness and
the available evidence on these issues in despite theological indoctrination. If it
were a matter of accumulation of academic degrees, an economist can be a law-
yer and a psychologist; or an educator can also be a historian and a social
worker. As the reader can suspect, it is implicit that here some sciences are given
a greater epistemic prestige though is no more than an authority argument de-
graded in fallacious reasoning. One needs no to be an astrophysicist nor a neu-
roscientist for discussing gods, politics, morals, or sports.
This pseudo-scientism privileges fundamental physics and molecular biology
over psychology and anthropology. For example, while a pandemic crisis is
mainly a medical and political issue, there is no reason not to listen to econo-
mists on the topic. Or rather, we should not hand over the Ministry of Economy
and Finances to a physician as surely this one would demand not to offer the
Ministry of Health to a journalist. More than a “war on science”, this can be seen
as a “battle royale of sciences” competing against each other though with clear
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disadvantages such as public funding and social prestige still reserved for the
natural sciences.
To be clear, we have to recognize which sciences are competent to answer
certain issues such as physics for the formation of the galaxy, or economics and
demography for avoiding an economic disaster. But denigrating some sciences
over others fosters their underdevelopment by warding off funding instead of
attracting human talent to these fields. Including them in the public discourse
will help them grow more scientific and socially relevant. Genuine scientism not
only rejects the promotion of pseudosciences, but also the expansion of this kind
of pseudo-scientism.
One can see similarities of this to the “scientistic thought” of Hawking, Nye o
DeGrasse who subordinate philosophical queries to science. This attempt is not
sound. For example, the abortion debate cannot be settled within biology or
medicine. An embryo is a human being, not a future calf. What is in dispute is not
its genetic identity, but whether it is ethically justified to interrupt the process.
Nonetheless, this “pseudo-scientism” is also a false portrayal of science disre-
garding other sciences. Hence, we must not stop our rational confidence in sci-
ences, but in men of science. Sometimes, scientists themselves can be impris-
oned by their own fame, prejudices, or philosophical misconceptions. Luckily,
scientific psychology already knows more about this than organic chemistry or
astrophysics.
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